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INTRODUCTION

As we advance in information society, more and more of the wealth created
consists of information. Personal data are an important subset of information and
are rapidly becoming a premium commodity. Industry and government collect and
use these data for purposes such as marketing, statistics and law enforcement.1
Many believe that personal information is well on its way to becoming one of the
most valuable forms of information in our society.
The advent of the global communications network raises treatment of personal
information to a level of acute significance. Technology provides tools that allow
processing of unprecedented masses of information; terabytes of digital data can be
stored in hundreds of thousands of databases around the world. They can be
replicated instantaneously in unlimited numbers and transmitted worldwide at the
press of a button. One of the principal areas of concern is that technology has
facilitated aggregation of personal data, i.e. data collected by one source for a certain
purpose can be combined with data collected by a different source for a different
2
purpose. All of these developments pose a serious risk to personal privacy.
Protection of personal data has emerged as a cutting-edge issue in the new
millennium. Most developed countries have passed comprehensive, often quite
stringent, legislation to protect privacy of personal data. 3 In the United States,
however, no such legislation has been passed. The existing laws are limited to
individual sectors of the economy. 4 Consequently, some form of comprehensive
legislation in the area of personal information is inevitable.
This paper proposes a combined legal and technological solution to protect
privacy in the context of increasing proliferation of personal information. By
harnessing the technological capabilities which lie at the root of the problem, greater
privacy protection is afforded to the individual, and the value of personal data is
maximized for the benefit of both consumer and user.

" Dana Beldiman is a partner of the law firm Carroll, Burdick & McDonough in San Francisco.
Her practice focuses on intellectual property and electronic commerce law.
1 Kathleen A. Linert, Database Marketing and PersonalPrivacy in the Information Age, 19
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 687, 687-88 (1995) (discussing how easily personal information about
spending, marital status, etc. is accessed).
2 See id. (discussing the fact that all personal information is available at the push of a button).
3 See id. at 70205 (explaining that the European countries have legislation promoting
individual privacy by protecting personal data).
4 See id. at 697-98 (qualifying certain legislation as only applicable to the government and not
the private sector); see also infra text accompanying notes 22-31 (discussing the sectoral nature of
U.S. privacy legislation).
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OVERVIEW

Part I of this paper discusses the state of privacy legislation in the U.S. and the
European Union ("EU"), and the factors that favor passage of personal data privacy
legislation in the U.S. These factors are (1) the growing concern about online
privacy; (2) the sectoral nature of privacy legislation in the U.S.; and (3) the need for
international harmonization of data privacy laws. Part I concludes that for these
reasons, legislation in the U.S. is not only necessary but inevitable.
Part II discusses the history and nature of Fair Information Principles ("FIPs")
as policy tools underlying privacy legislation, illustrated by means of the Safe Harbor
Framework formulation.
Part III examines the structure of personal data transfer transactions. The
focus is on how an individual's choices regarding treatment of personal data
("preferences") can be honored in the course of multiple successive ("downstream")
transactions.
Two elements must be passed on downstream to ensure that
preferences are honored: (1) the obligation (whether contractual or imposed by law)
to observe the preferences in a manner consistent with the FIPs; and (2) the data
themselves, along with information relating to preferences.
Part III further
discusses possible theories that would support an obligation to honor an individual's
privacy preferences. The most appealing model is the law of trade secrets, because it
allows the parties the maximum freedom to contract, with only minimal interference
by imposed legal norms. Although this model is appealing, the reality remains that
the sheer volume of data and preferences makes compliance with the FIPs at an
internationally acceptable level extremely burdensome to the data collector or user.
Part IV outlines a concept for a two-prong solution, consisting of a legal and a
technological component.
The solution addresses the downstream transfer of
personal data and preferences by delegating it to a technological infrastructure.
Technology is the natural answer to the data problem, because technology lies at the
origin of the present proliferation of personal data. The infrastructure ensures that
data are permanently associated with their preferences; and that they can be
accessed by authorized users.
It also performs the requisite FIPs function
electronically. Once the data transfer function is outsourced and the FIPs obligation
discharged, the legal component falls into place easily. A mandatory norm imposes,
by common law or statute, an obligation erga omnes to observe the preferences stated
by the data subject. This obligation is analogized to the real estate doctrine of a
"covenant running with the land," under which a transferee takes property subject to
pre-existing obligation incident to the property. The value of data will be maximized,
benefiting both data subject and user because the underlying technology allows for a
fine-tuning of the data subject's preferences.

[2:071 2002]

An Information Society Approach to Privacy Legislation

I. THE STATE OF PRIVACY LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION

A. FaetorsFavoringPersonalData Legislation

1. Growing ConcernsAbout Online Privacy
Concerns about personal data privacy are on the increase. 5 The use of privacy
invasive technologies such as cookies, web bugs, spy ware, etc. is becoming more and
more common.6 Yet the legal basis for finding liability for these invasions is lacking.
A case in point is the DoubleCliek litigation.7 DoubleClick Inc. collected potentially
personally-identifiable information on Internet users, including names, e-mail
addresses, home and business addresses, telephone numbers, searches performed on
the Internet, and web sites visited. 8 The purpose for collecting this information was
to build demographic profiles for targeted banner advertisements. 9 The users sued,
claiming this information was personal in nature and not what one would ordinarily
expect advertisers to be able to collect.10
Several actions were filed against DoubleClick, the most notable one being a
consolidated class action in the Southern District of New York.11 The allegations
included claims under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Federal
Wiretap Statutes, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).12
In March
2001, the court was forced to dismiss the action, holding that no liability could be
established under any of the theories alleged. 13 None of the numerous privacyrelated laws were capable of providing redress for DoubleClick's alleged
misconduct.14

With respect to the ECPA claim, the court found that, because the "electronic
information services" were provided through the Internet, DoubleClick was exempt
from the ECPA.15 Accessing cookie identification numbers fell outside the ambit of
the statute because the statute only covered "electronic storage" relating to

5 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT TO CONGRESS, p. 1, available
at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2ooo.pdf (May 22, 2000) [hereinafter FTC,
PRIVACY ONLINE].

I d.
7 In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
8 Id. at 502.

9 Id. at 502-03.
10Id. at 502.
11Id. at 500.
12 Id. at 499.
13 Id. at 526 (dismissing Plaintiffs federal claims thus vitiating the district court's jurisdiction).
14 Id. (explaining the absence of evidence in legislative and judicial history prohibiting the
conduct at issue).
15Id. at 511.
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temporarily stored communications. 16
Although DoubleClick had intercepted
electronic communications between plaintiffs and DoubleClick's clients, the wiretap
claims were also dismissed because DoubleClick's websites had consented to such
interception, and the interception was not done "for purpose of committing a criminal
or tortuous act." 17 Finally, the CFAA claims were dismissed because plaintiffs could
18
not establish the damage threshold required for the statute.
Conduct such as that of DoubleClick's is the nightmare of most Internet users. 19
The Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") Privacy Online Report Survey found that
"92% of consumers are concerned (67% are 'very concerned') about the misuse of their
personal information online. 76% of the consumers who are not generally concerned
about the misuse of their personal information, fear privacy intrusions on the
Internet."20 Yet despite these widespread fears and the outcry of the press when the
DoubleCliek facts first became public, under U.S. law this type of conduct is not
actionable. 21

2. The SeetoralNature ofPrivacyLegislationin the U.S
Unlike other countries, the U.S. has approached personal data legislation by
sector. 22 The result is a patchwork of laws that are not particularly compatible. The
approach to legislating can best be characterized as "knee-jerk."23 For instance,
disclosure of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork's video viewing choices in the
course of congressional hearings relating to his nomination resulted in prompt
24
passage of the Video Privacy Protection Act.
The most notable examples of sectoral privacy legislation include the GrammLeach-Bliley Act ("GLB")25 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA"),26 the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA"),27 the Privacy
Act,28 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),29 the Electronic Communications

fld.
at 511-12.
17Id. at 513-18.
18 Id. at 518-26.
19 Id. at 502 (explaining that collected information is considered personal and private).
20 FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 5, at 2.
21 It should be noted, however, that a California state court claim on the same facts settled for
an undisclosed amount. Judnick v. DoubleClick, No. CV 000421 (Superior Court, Marin County, Cal.
Jan. 27, 2000), http://1egal.web.aol.com/decisions/dlpriv/doubleclick.pdf (last visited October 18,
2002). California's state constitution protects consumers from acts invading their privacy. Id.
22 Linert, supra note 1, at 698.
23 Id.(stating that U.S. legislation is reactionary).
24 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6810 (2000) (regulating disclosure by financial institutions of personally
identifiable information).
20 For legislation governing information collected online, see Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§§ 262, 264; soo also 45 C.F.R. §§ 160-164.502 (2002) (governing security and privacy).
27 For legislation governing information collected online from children below the age of thirteen
see 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2000); soo also 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2002).
28 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000) (governing the handling of federal employees' personal data).
2) 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (governing the handling of consumer credit reports).
16
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Privacy Act (ECPA),30 and the Video Privacy Protection Act. 31 Altogether, there are
more than thirty federal laws, as well as innumerable state laws that affect the
handling of personal information.
The existence of so many laws poses problems from both substantive and
structural standpoints. Substantively, the numerous discrepant norms that govern
personal data, are confusing to consumers and collectors of data alike. 32 From the
structural standpoint, each law requires establishment of a particular technological
infrastructure. The requirements for the various infrastructures differ because the
norms mandating them differ. 33 Absent a common technological standard for
collecting, storing and transmitting personal information, the individual regulated
sectors will be unable to communicate among themselves. 34 For instance, despite the
existence of sophisticated internal storage and processing solutions, information from
the healthcare system may have to be transferred manually to that of a bank,
because the two architectures are not interoperable. This is a huge cost to society.
35
Enforcement of data privacy violations falls within the purview of the FTC.
The FTC's enforcement authority derives primarily from Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Act, 36 which empowers the Commission to "prevent unfair methods of
37
competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."
Currently, outside the few regulated sectors, such as health and banking, no
mandatory norm exists that would impose a particular conduct on collectors of data.
Companies are not required to have privacy policies. 38 Enforcement by the FTC is,
therefore, limited to violations of a data collector's own voluntarily implemented
policy. 39 In other words, a data collector who has no policy at all can engage in the
most outrageous privacy transgressions, without falling within the ambit of the FTC.
If the data collector is not part of a regulated sector, privacy violations are likely to go
unpunished.
Passage of a more comprehensive legislative framework to protect online privacy
has been at the center of the public debate for several years. Numerous bills were
introduced into Congress in 2000 and early 2001, and passage of a law was expected
imminently. However, in early October 2001, a sudden shift of direction occurred
when the Chairman of the FTC announced an agenda focused on tougher

30 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000) (containing provisions regarding the interception of wire, oral and
electronic communications, and the unauthorized access to stored data).
31Id. at § 2710 (prohibiting wrongful disclosure of video rental records).
32 Maj. R. Ken Pippin, Consumer Privacyon the Internot:Its "'Surfer
Bewaro' 47 A.F. L. REV.
125, 140 (1999) (explaining that most internet users are not experienced users).
33 Suzanne M. Thompson, The DigitalExplosion Comes With a Cost: The Loss of Privacy,4 J.
TECH. L. & POL'Y 3, 26 (1999) (discussing industry norms which provide standards for control).
a3 Id. (stating that legal regulation usually protects a single activity or area and does not
address all issues of collections, storage, use, and disclosure).
35Pippin, supra note 32, at 133 (discussing how the FTC enforces consumer protection laws).

a315 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000).
37 Id.
38 See FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 5, at 34. In its Privacy Online Report, the FTC makes

recommendations as to norms that should govern online data collection activities. These norms
follow the generally accepted fair information practices of Notice, Choice, Access and Security, but
remain purely voluntary. Id. at 36-37.
39Id. at 33-34.
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enforcement of existing laws, rather than passage of new legislation. 40 In his speech
Chairman Muris stated "there is a great deal we can do under existing laws to
protect consumer privacy .... We will use our full arsenal of tools - cases, changes to

our Telemarketing Sales Rule, workshops, and education ... "41 Unfortunately, this
"arsenal" sounds less than impressive, and the absence of adequate "weapons" can
lead to aberrations. Most notably, the FTC announced in early 2002 that it will hold
companies' offline activities to the promises made with respect to their online
42
activities.

3. The Need ForInternationalHarmonization
In a global economy, it is virtually impossible to confine personal data to
national borders. Multinational companies, financial institutions, airlines, and credit
card companies cannot function without transferring data between countries.43 The
44
absence of a harmonized legal system impedes the trans-border flow of data.
Under the laws of most European countries, protection of personal data is a
fundamental human right. 45 Europeans are very concerned that transmitting
sensitive data to a country with different privacy standards will lead to their
46
unauthorized proliferation, particularly via electronic means.
Most of the current European Union ("EU") member states' data protection laws
derive from the European Union Data Protection Directive ("Directive"). 47 The
Directive contains fundamental principles pertaining to data protection and has been
adopted in almost all member states. 48 The Directive requires national laws to set
stringent standards for protection of the information collected about an identified or
identifiable individual, whether or not the data is publicly available. 49 The Directive
40Timothy J. Muris, FTC Chairman, Remarks at the Privacy 2001 Conference, Cleveland,
Ohio, (October 4, 2001), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002.htm.
41 Jd
42 J. Howard Beales I1, Director of FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, at the Annual
Meeting of Promotion Marketing Association, December 5, 2001, at
http ://www.fte.gov/speeches/other/bealeseonsumprotectagenda.htm.
43 For an overview of the kinds of personal information involved in transborder exchanges, see

REINHARD

ELLGER,

DER DATENSCHUTZ

IM GRENZUBERSCHREITENDEN

DATENVERKEHR

108-29

(1990). Ellger finds that the most intensive transborder data flows occur in the following areas: (1)
personnel departments; (2) banks, insurance companies, credit card companies, and credit bureaus;
(3) direct marketing; (4) airlines, travel agencies, and other business involved in tourism; (5)
companies that seek to deliver goods to or otherwise trade with international customers; and (6)
within the public sector: police, customs, tax departments, and public pension agencies. Id.
44Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting InternationalData Privacy Rules in Cyberspace,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1351 (2000).
45 Id. at 1347.
46Id. at 1351.
47Directive 95146ECof the European Parliamentand of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection ofIndividuals with Regard to the Processingof PersonalData and on the FreeMovement
of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Directive 951461ECl. This directive is scheduled for
implementation in all member states, however, the process of implementation is still ongoing as of
the date of this writing. Id.
48 For instance, in May 2001, Germany revised its data protection law to effectively incorporate
the provisions of the Directive. Id.
49Id.
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further requires an individual's consent prior to processing personal information for
purposes other than those contemplated by the original data collector. 5° Member
States may restrict the processing of defined "sensitive" data such as religious or
sexual preferences and health information. 51
Collection and use of personal
information not relevant for the stated purpose of processing is restricted. 52 The
Directive further imposes rules of transparency, notice to data subjects, access of
data subjects to their data and the ability to correct any errors. 53 Organizations must
maintain appropriate security for the processing of personal information. 54
To avoid circumvention of the stringent European laws by transfer outside the
EU, the Directive includes provisions that ensure that European rules govern all
personal information. 55 The trans-border data flow provision prohibits the transfer
56
of personal information to countries that do not have "adequate" privacy protection.
The "adequacy" requirement can be met by either: (1) a finding of the European
Commission that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection; 57 or (2) via
58
contractual obligations between the parties exchanging data.
Contractual obligations can be set forth in an agreement between the parties
exchanging data. 59 The agreement must require the non-EU importer to follow the
60
data protection law of the member state in which the data exporter is located.
Alternatively, model clauses prescribed by the EU Commission can be used. These
clauses are valid for all EU member countries and avoid the inconvenience of
61
multiple legal regimes.
Because the privacy legislation prescribed by the EU is so comprehensive and
touches upon all spheres of the economy, many businesses view it as being too
onerous.6 2 Groups in the EU member states have advocated simplification of what
was perceived as over-regulation. Nonetheless, other countries are looking at the
European Directive as the basic model for information privacy. Canada, as well as
countries in South America and Eastern Europe are adopting EU-style privacy

5oId. at arts. 14, 15.
51 IN. at art. 8, 4.
52 Id. at

art. 6.

53 Id. at arts. 9-12, 14-15, 18-19, 21.

Id. at art. 17.
Id.

5o4
55

56 Id. at art. 25.
57 Id. The European Commission has found that some countries, for example Switzerland and
Hungary, provide "an adequate level of protection." Id.
58 Id. at art. 26, cl. 2.
59 Id. at art. 26.
60 Id.
61 The model contractual clauses consist of ten clauses and several appendices and generally
cover the following areas: (1) obligations of the data exporter; (2) obligations of the data importer;
(3) liability; (4) applicable law and enforceability of the clauses; and (5) jurisdiction. The model
clauses have received considerable criticism from business groups, based on the fact that they are
unnecessarily burdensome and prescriptive, that they impose joint and several liability on the data
importer and exporter, and that they require the data importer to submit to the jurisdiction of the
member state from which the data originated.
2 Jane Black, Self-Policing on Privacy?Forget It, BUSINESS WEEK (July 6, 2001), availablo at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jul2001/nf2001076_893.htm.
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laws. 63 One of the perceived reasons for doing so is "the conceptual appeal of a
comprehensive set of data protection standards in an increasingly interconnected
64
environment of online and offline data."

The European Commission considered U.S. privacy laws and concluded that the
protection offered by the U.S. laws is not "adequate" protection for purposes of data
transfer from the EU to the U.S. This fact imposes a considerable burden on crossborder business between the U.S. and EU member states. To resolve this potential
clash, the U.S. and EU negotiated the "Safe Harbor Framework," which would allow
individual companies to implement procedures deemed "adequate" for receipt of data
6
from the EU.

5

The Safe Harbor Framework consists of a set of principles that establish
procedures relating to transfer of personal data. U.S. data recipients who adhere to
the principles set forth by the Framework will be deemed to provide an adequate
level of protection. 66 The Safe Harbor principles reflect the U.S. approach to privacy
but at the same time are designed to meet the European Union Privacy Directive
requirements.
Although the Safe Harbor framework has been adopted, it does not resolve the
fundamental differences between the two systems.67 Because it is cumbersome to
implement, the program has been slow to start. 68 In the two years since its adoption,
less than 200 U.S. companies have joined the Framework, and few of them are
Fortune 500 companies. 69 Companies complain that adhering to the Framework
subjects them to enforcement by both the EU and the FTC. The Safe Harbor has also
been criticized because it gives preferential treatment to personal data of non-U.S.
nationals, while personal data of U.S. citizens are subject to U.S. law that even in
70
legislated sectors in the U.S. is less stringent.
The three factors discussed above - the growing concerns about online privacy,
the sectoral nature of U.S. privacy legislation and the need for international
harmonization -militate strongly for adoption of privacy legislation. The question is
not so much whether regulation of personal data will be passed in the U.S., but what
norms this type of law should contain to accomplish the desired policy goals. The
following section will examine the Fair Information Principles, the leading policy
6 Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Privacy Institute for Intellectual Property and
Information Law Symposium. E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy,38 HOUS. L. REV. 717, 737
(2001).

6 Id.
65

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

COMMERCE,

SAFE

HARBOR

PRIVACY

PRINCIPLES

(July

21,

2000),

http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL [hereinafter SAFE HARBOR].
66 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Cover letter from Robert S. LaRussa, Acting Under Secretary for
International
Trade
Administration,
to
U.S.
organizations
(July
21,
2000),
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh-documents.html.
67 See generallyLynn Chuang Kramer, Comment, Private Eyes Are Watching You. Consumer
Online Privacy Protection-Lessons from Home and Abroad, 37 TEX. INTL L.J. 387, 396-411 (2002)
(comparing the EU and U.S. systems).
68 Reidenberg, supra note 63, at 746 (noting that after 7 months of the Safe Harbor Framework
coming into effect, fewer than fifty-five organizations were participating), see also Kramer, supra
note 67, at 399 (noting that after 1 year, less than 135 companies were participating).
(39
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR LIST (2002), availableat

http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list
self-certify to adhere to the Safe Harbor Framework).
70 Reidenberg, supra note 63, at 746.

(listing organizations that
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tools for privacy regulation. These principles are recognized by the EU Directive, the
Safe Harbor Principles and existing U.S legislation and constitute a sine qua non
element of legislation in the field of privacy.

II. HISTORY AND NATURE OF FAIR INFORMATION PRINCIPLES

A. FairInformation Prineiplesas Tools for PrivacyRegulation
Fair Information Principles ("FIPs") are norms for the treatment of personal
data shared across cultures. They are the leading policy tool for privacy regulation in
the U.S. and elsewhere and have been incorporated into most privacy laws.7 1 The
U.S. began developing these principles in the 1970's.72 Their present form appeared
in the 1980's in such privacy legislation as the Privacy Act and the Fair Credit
Reporting Act. 73 They also are present in early European privacy provisions, such as
74
the OECD guidelines.
The FIPs have been formulated in different manners, but apart from minor
variations, the core principles are the same.7 5 At a fairly high level of abstraction,
Paul Schwartz, one of the leading authors on privacy issues, articulates four FIPs as
follows: (1) defined obligations that limit the use of personal data; (2) transparent
processing systems; (3) limited procedural and substantive rights; and (4) external or
76
governmental oversight.
One of the earliest expressions of the FIPs in U.S. legislation is contained in the
Privacy Act of 1974. The Act provides that: (1) there should be no secret record
keeping systems; (2) information collected for one purpose should not be used for
another purpose without the consent of the individual; (3) individuals should be given
access to information held about them and the opportunity to correct or amend that
information; (4) information is kept relevant, accurate and up to date; and (5)
information is protected against unauthorized loss, alteration and disclosure.77 The
substance of these principles has been incorporated to varying degrees in subsequent
legislation.

FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 5, at 3.
In 1974 Congress passed the Privacy Act. However, this statute only protected personal
information held by the federal government. A REVIEW OF THE FAIR INFORMATION PRINCIPLES: THE
71

72

FOUNDATION OF PRIVACY PUBLIC POLICY, at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/fairinfo.htm

(last

visited Oct. 12, 2002).
73 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
74 Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal
Data, O.E.C.D Doe. C (80) 58 (Final), adopted Sept. 23 1980.
75 Reidenberg, supra note 44, at 1325.
76 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of PersonalHealth Care Information, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Health Care Information]; see also Paul M. Schwartz,
Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,52 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacy
and Democracy].
77 M. ROTENBERG, THE PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK 2002, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION
CENTER, p. 39.
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The Safe Harbor Framework7 8 lists seven principles that are consistent with
both formulations mentioned above. Its first four principles (notice, choice, access
and security) are also contained in the FTC's Privacy Online Report.7 9 Because the
Safe Harbor formulation meets the requirements of both the EU and the U.S., and
because it is stated in a comprehensive, succinct and specific manner, it will serve as
analytical framework for this paper. Furthermore, the fact that these principles
have been agreed upon by the both EU and the U.S. in the course of the Safe Harbor
80
negotiations supports the notion that they enjoy wide acceptance.
The following will summarize the requirements of the Safe Harbor FIPs:
NOTICE: Organizations must notify data subjects that information is being
collected, for what purpose it is collected, how individuals can contact the
organizations with inquiries and complaints, to whom information is disclosed, and
81
what choices the individual has for limiting use and disclosure.
CHOICE: "Organizations must give individuals the opportunity to choose ("opt
out") whether their personal information [may be] disclosed to a third party or used
for a purpose incompatible with the purpose for which it was originally collected or
subsequently authorized by the individual. For sensitive information, affirmative or
explicit ("opt in"), choice must be given if the information is to be disclosed to a third
party or used for a purpose other than its original purpose or the purpose authorized
82
subsequently by the individual."
ONWARD TRANSFER: "Where an organization wishes to transfer information to a
third party that is acting as an agent, it may do so if it makes sure that the third
party subscribes to the safe harbor principles or is subject to the directive [or a
finding of "adequacy"]. As an alternative, the organization can enter into a written
agreement with such third party requiring that the third party provide at least the
83
same level of privacy protection as is required by the relevant principles."
ACCESS: Generally, "individuals must be given access to personal information
about them that an organization holds." They must "be able to correct, amend, or
delete that information where it is inaccurate." Exceptions to this general rule are
permitted "where the burden or expense of providing access would be
disproportionate to the risks to the individual's privacy in the case in question, or
84
where the rights of persons other than the individual would be violated."
SECURITY: "Organizations must take reasonable precautions to protect personal
information from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and
85
destruction."
DATA INTEGRITY: "Personal information must be relevant for the purposes for
which it is to be used. An organization should take reasonable steps to ensure that
8 6
data is reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and current."

SAFE HARBOR, supra note 65, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.
supra note 5, at iii.
80 SAFE HARBOR, supra note 65, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.
81 Id.
82 Id.
78

79 FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE,

83
84

Id.
Id.

85

d.

8 Id.
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ENFORCEMENT: An organization must have "readily available and affordable

independent recourse mechanisms [that allow] each individual's [complaints] to be
investigated and resolved and damages to be awarded where the applicable law or
private sector initiatives so provide." In addition, the organization must establish
procedures for verifying that the commitments to adhere to the Safe Harbor
Principles are implemented. Finally, the organization must remedy problems arising
out of a failure to comply with the principles. "Sanctions must be sufficiently
87
rigorous to ensure compliance by the organization."
An additional principle that is not mentioned in the Safe Harbor Framework is
the principle of FINALITY, which prohibits an organization from processing personal
information in a way that is incompatible with the purposes for which it has been
collected or subsequently authorized by the individual.88 It is one of the main
principles of the European Directive, and it has been recognized in the U.S. in
legislation such as the Privacy Act and in case law arising under it. 89

I1.

STRUCTURE OF PERSONAL DATE TRANSER TRANSACTIONS

A. ProtectionOf PersonalDataIn Downstream Transactions (OnwardTransfer)
Personal data differ from other types of intellectual property in the nature of
their use. While patents and copyrights are typically subject to a single transfer,
from the inventor or creator to the user, 90 personal information is, as a rule, subject
to numerous successive transfers. 91 This is due to the fact that, unlike other
intellectual property, the value of personal data lies in their ability to be re-used
92
multiple times, rather than in their intrinsic value, which often is minimal.
Frequent re-use brings with it the risk of frequent invasions of privacy, as the
following scenario illustrates.
Assume an individual makes a purchase from Amazon.com.
She discloses
personal information in reliance on Amazon's stated privacy policies. The policies
87 Id.

88 Marc Rotenberg, FairInformation Practicesand the Architecture ofPrivacy STAN. TECH. L.

REV. 1, 31(2001).
89 Britt v. Naval Investigative Serv., 886 F.2d 544, 549 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Congress limited
interagency

disclosures

to

more

restrictive

circumstances.

There

must

be a

more

concrete

relationship or similarity, some meaningful degree of convergence, between the disclosing agency's
purpose in gathering the information and in its disclosure."); see also Covert v. Harrington, 876 F.2d
751, 755 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that information collected for security clearance purposes is
incompatible with disclosure for criminal investigation of subsequent actions); Mazaleski v.
Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 713 n. 31 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that derogatory information concerning a
federal employee's dismissal not compatible with disclosure to prospective employer).
90 Even in a situation involving multiple licensees, the transaction is ordinarily between
owner/inventor and licensee, as opposed to from one licensee to another. The value to the user lies in
the substance of the property, and not, as with personal information in the ability to transfer it.
91 Anna E. Shimanek, Do You Want Milk with Those Cookies?: Complying with the Safe

Ha-rborPrivacyPrinciples,26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 455, 457-68 (2001).
92 Id. at 457.
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provide that the information will not be used for solicitation and will not be sold to
third party marketers or aggregators. Amazon abides by these policies. However,
Amazon then sends the purchase out for fulfillment to FedEx, along with the
individual's personal information. FedEx has a different policy and promptly turns
around and sells the data to an aggregator, such as Acxiom. 93 The aggregator may
already have a file on the particular individual, a file which contains information
derived from sources such as a local grocery store or the DMV. Even though some of
the data may be anonymous, in many cases, they contain enough clues to be matched
with an already existing file. These aggregated data are then sold or leased many
times to advertisers in the direct marketing industry.
This scenario shows that even though the data subject's instructions on the
handling of there data were observed in the first transaction, the data subject's
privacy was breached because her instructions were not communicated and not
observed in subsequent transactions. This scenario can be avoided by implementing
the concept of "onward transfer." This concept essentially limits transfer of data to
third parties who do not have adequate data protection measures in place. Under the
Safe Harbor formulation of this principle, the collector of personal data may transfer
information to a third party only if the third party (1) subscribes to the Principles; (2)
is subject to the Directive or other adequacy finding; or (3) enters into a written
agreement to provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by
the relevant Principles. 94 This essentially means that a transferee of data must
either be governed by a law which protects data in accordance with specified
Principles, or must contractually agree that it will do so; otherwise the protection of
the personal data transferred is not ensured.
Yet "onward transfer" has received little in-depth treatment from commentators
and courts. The concept is present to a very limited extent in U.S. legislation and
only on a sectoral basis 95 and it is conspicuously absent from the FTC Report
formulation. Nonetheless, this principle is key in structuring norms of conduct
governing personal data privacy, because a law that fails to protect privacy in the
course of downstream transactions offers only illusory protection.
9 Acxiom maintains the largest collection of personal data outside the U.S. Government. Its
database contains detailed information about 160 million people and its contents is made available
to the marketing industry via services such as "[a]cquire new numbers for telemarketing,"
"[a]ppend telephone number to name and address," or "[llinkage to individual customer information
from multiple data sources for specific marketing applications." ACXIOM, CORPORATE OVERVIEW, at
http://www.acxiom.com/DisplayMain/0,1494,USA-en-514-3100-0-,00.html
(last visited Oct. 11,

2002).
91See SAFE HARBOR, supra note 65, at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL ("Where an organization wishes to
transfer information to a third party that is acting as an agent .... it may do so if it first either
ascertains that the third party subscribes to the Principles or is subject to the Directive or another
adequacy finding or enters into a written agreement with such third party requiring that the third
party provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by the relevant Principles.")
95 For example, regulations under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act require financial institutions to
enter contractual agreements with service providers to whom non-public personal data are disclosed,
prohibiting further disclosure and use of the data for purposes other than for which they were
disclosed. 12 C.F.R. § 216.12 (2000). Additionally, the HIPAA Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information provides for "de-identification" of personal information by removing
individually identifiable information. De-identified information may be used or disclosed freely as
long as no means of re-identification is disclosed. 45 C.F.R. § 165.514 (2000).
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B. The Anatomy ofDownstream Transactions
Before considering norms of conduct governing downstream transfer, it is
helpful to analyze the mechanism of downstream data transactions.
Assume A, an individual (referred to as "data subject" 96 in this

paper) enters into a transaction with B, a data collector or user, in
which A allows B to use A's data in exchange for consideration. The
transaction between A and B works in practice, because A has data
that are of value to B and the power to exclude B from access to the
data. Because the data are valuable to B, B is willing to pay for
access and also to make a promise that the data will be treated in
accordance with A's preferences. If B breaches, A can sue for
damages.
Up to this point, the marketplace has achieved a
workable outcome.
If the data are to be transferred downstream in a subsequent transaction from B
to C and from C to D, the marketplace model does not necessarily hold true. To
protect A's interests, the downstream transaction must consist of the following
bargain: B provides the data to C in exchange for payment, accompanied by two
promises: (1) that C will honor A's preferences and otherwise abide by the FIPs 97 and
(2) that C will elicit the same promises (i.e. to observe A's preferences and to elicit a
promise to the same effect from its transferee) from D. Although A is now out of the
picture as far as the transaction is concerned, A's preferences still govern the use of
the data. In effect, B, C and any other downstream sellers act as agents for A, in that
they protect A's preferences. Two difficulties arise: (1) the transaction costs are
increased by eliciting the additional promises from the downstream transferee; 98 and
96 The term "data subject" is borrowed from the European Directive and the Safe Harbor
Principles, and refers to the individual whose personal data are at issue.
97 See Jeffrey B. Ritter et al., Emerging Trends in InternationalPrivacyLaw, 15 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 87, 131-32 (2001). If A's interests are to be fully protected, B would be responsible for the
following:
The effective delivery of notice to the data subject in connection with the original
collection of the personal data; the adequacy of that notice under any applicable
legal requirements that regulate the collection; the proper recognition (and
disposition) of any opt-in/opt-out elections by the data subject, and the adequacy
of the records relating to such elections; the accuracy and integrity of all records
created in which the personal data has been collected and maintained; the
consistency of usage of the data - i.e., the collector and any processor (including A)
have used the data consistently with the disclosures made in the notice provided
to the data subject; and the maintenance of suitable access and correction
processes relating to inaccurate information (necessary to assuring B of no
secondary liability for processing or relying upon inaccurate information).
Id. The requirement of abiding by the FIPs imposes a huge additional burden on the transferee.
One could argue that this burden is not required by A. However, the fact is that by the time the data
have undergone dozens of transfers A will have lost track of them, and can only be protected by the
practices incorporated by the FIPs.
98 An additional component to be considered is the cost of honoring A's preferences. This may
exceed the transaction costs, because it requires the establishment and maintenance of a complex
infrastructure and reduces the consideration received by the transferor. Alternatively, this cost
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(2) consideration for the promises reduces the payment to the transferor. This is
troublesome because the beneficiary of the promises is A and not the transferor.
Otherwise viewed, B, C, D and others act as agents for A without being paid by A.
This does not make for a sustainable model without further norms being imposed by
common law or statute.
To summarize, a comprehensive and viable solution must find a way to include
in each downstream transfer of data (1) the obligation to comply with the data
subject's preferences and abide by the FIPs and (2) the preferences themselves. The
following section will discuss potential legal bases for the obligation to comply with
the data subject's preferences.

C. Legal Bases for Norms ProtectingPersonalDataPrivacy
The concept of protecting personal data privacy is not new to U.S. law. Review
of the sectoral legislation governing privacy of personal data indicates clearly that an
individual's privacy as it relates to personal information deserves some level of
protection. 99 Conceptually this protection could derive from a number of possible
sources such as a property right, 100 similar to the one that exists in other types of
intellectual property, or the "penumbrae" of tort rights protecting against invasion of
privacy.101 Alternatively, it could be based on an unjust enrichment theory10 2 or arise
out of the legislature's concern about individuals' cognitive difficulties in appreciating
103
the risks of supplying personal data to the private sector.
Different legal theories have been proposed as solutions for the data privacy
issue. One suggested approach is to grant individuals a property right in their
personal information.10 4 The transfer of personal information would occur based on
the same rules as the transfer of tangible property and would be governed by market
mechanisms. Depending on the individual's perception of the value of her personal
information, a price tag would be associated with the transaction. 10 5 This method is
perceived as a simple way to convey the individual's preferences to the market and it

could be viewed as a business risk to the data collector. After all, if the cost of doing business
exceeds the revenue, maybe data collection is not a viable business. See Jessica Litman, Information
PrivacylInformationProperty,52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1298 (2000).
99 See HIPAA standards, 45 C.F.R. § 165.514 (2000); The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 216.12 (2000); The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
100 Eg., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYPERSPACE, at 160-61.
101Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessigs Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, PrivacyControl,and FairInformation Practices,2000 WiS. L. REV 743, 777-78 (2000).
102 The argument has been made that failure to control the use of personal information, would
allow a sort of free riding, or unjust enrichment without compensating the people whose existence
makes the enrichment possible. A telling example is that in 1988, the three leading credit bureaus
made almost $1 billion from selling credit information, while paying the consumers whose
information they were selling zero. E. Volokh, Free Speech and Information Privacy, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1049, 1074 (2000).
103 Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as IntellectualProperty,52 STAN. L. REV.1125, 1144 (2000).
104 LESSIG, supra note 100, at 160-61.
105 Paul M. Schwartz & Joel R. Reidenberg, BOOK REVIEW. A Now -ind of Privacy?
Regulating Uses ofPersonalDatain the GlobalInformation Economy, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 767-68

(1999).
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presents the advantage of not requiring legislative or judicial intervention in the
10 6
normal course of the transactions.
Others have rejected the property model for such reasons as the market failure
for personal information,10 7 concerns about incoherence in the field of intellectual
property law if personal information receives the same treatment as other categories
of intellectual property,108 or the view that information privacy may be a
fundamental civil right, one that cannot be left to the vagaries of the market.1 0 9
A further reason for rejecting a property model relates to the genesis and
function of personal information. Intangible assets - patents, trademarks or
copyrights - are created by individuals and granted protection by society for policy
reasons.110 Personal information is created by society at large to fulfill a very specific
function, viz. identification of individuals.11 1 An individual's exercise of the right to
exclude others from using her personal information could interfere with essential
public needs. Consider the difficulty of identifying "the Artist Formerly Known As
Prince." If individuals had the right to withdraw not just their names, but their
social security numbers, addresses, educational information, health records, etc. from
public use, chaos would be inevitable. 11 2 Finally, concerns have also been expressed
11 3
that the property model could give rise to tensions with the First Amendment.
The scholarly debate has also considered liability models. 114 The criticisms of
these models include the facts that: (1) a post-disclosure remedy in the form of
damages does not adequately compensate the data subject; and (2) a liability model
alone does not provide for a mechanism to control how the data are treated
1 15
downstream.
Review of these authorities makes it evident that the exact nature of the
doctrine protecting personal data is still subject to debate, as is the extent and form
of an individual's right in personal data.11 6 Nonetheless, the principle that can be
distilled from existing legislation and case law is that individuals have, at a
minimum, some right to control the use of their personal information as it relates to
106 See Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, US. Government Information Policy (July 30, 1997) at
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-hal/Papers/policy/policy.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002); see also
Kenneth C. Laudon, MrktsnndPrivay,COMM. ACM (Sept. 1996).
107Schwartz, Health Care Information, supra note 76, at 31.
108 Schwartz & Reidenberg, supranote 105, at 776.
109 Samuelson, supra note 103, at 1142. The option of granting an individual rights in their
personal property based on a moral rights theory has also been considered and rejected. Id.
110 E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The policy underlying patents and copyrights encourages
Congress to "promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." Id
111 In addition to the basic "identification' function, personal data serve an "evaluation
function, i.e. by placing an individual's personal information into context in the public forum, society
is able to make political decisions. Schwartz, supra note 101, at 760.
112 Concerns about withdrawal from public use of terms necessary to identify common objects
also lies at the basis of the bar for registration of generic trademarks. See CES Pubrg Corp. v. St.
Regis Publ'ns Inc., 531 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1975).
113See Volokh, supra note 102, at 1088. However, the First Amendment covers "information."
If a norm limiting disclosure applies only to "data," the First Amendment is probably not violated.
114 See S. Safier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line.*Privacy in Cyberspace, 5 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 6 (2000).
115 See Samuelson, supranote 103, at 1132.
116See Mark A. Lemley, Private Propertj 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1545-46 (2000).
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protection of their privacy. 117

This standard will be used as premise for the

discussion that follows.

D. The Law of Trade Secrets- a Viable PraetcalModel?
The focus of the present paper is to find a practical solution that would protect
personal data privacy in downstream transactions. An appealing model, which
combines both property and liability concepts, is the law of trade secrets. 118 The
mechanism of transacting personal data transfers could easily follow that of a trade
secret transfer; both types of transactions are based on a contract, wherein the
consideration consists of a monetary or other qidpro quo accompanied by a promise.
The promise in trade secrets transactions is confidentiality, while in personal
information transactions the promise would be to observe the data subject's
preferences and the FIPs and to pass on the obligation to subsequent transferees.
From a policy standpoint, trade secret law is premised on a societal interest in
stimulating invention and prohibiting immoral commercial conduct. 119 To achieve
120
this, the law has recognized a quasi-property right in the owner of the trade secret.
The law further provides that information designated by its owner as a trade secret
may not be disclosed to third parties. 121 The law does not further concern itself with
the terms of the contract, the type of property, its value, commercial terms, etc.
These are left up to the parties. General liability concepts are used to impose a
limited number of default terms. This model is appealing because it allows the
parties maximum bargaining power in conjunction with a minimum number of
legislated norms 122 while adequately protecting the trade secret owner's interests in
the event of a breach.

117

Soo supratext accompanying notes 101-03.

118 Samuelson, supra note 103, at 1152.
119 Based on the public policy that proscribes immoral commercial conduct, trade secret law

contains a minimal number of default terms and procedural provisions. Trade secret law also
provides a right against third party users of protected information. A third party which knows or
has reason to know that the information has been obtained by improper means incurs liability. If
the third party obtained the information innocently, unauthorized use may be prevented after notice
to the innocent user. See generally California Uniform Trade Secrets Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426
(2002).
120 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 987 (1984).
121

"One is subject to liability for the appropriation of another's trade secret if... (b) the actor.

discloses the other's trade secret ... and, at the time of the . . . disclosure, (3) the actor knows or
should know that the information is a trade secret that the actor acquired from or through a person
who acquired it by means that are improper . . . or whose disclosure of the trade secret . . .
constituted a breach of a duty of confidence owed to . . . the other." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995).
122 A look at the provisions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act confirms the simplicity of the
legislative scheme, premised on the public policy against immoral commercial conduct. The main
operative provisions are contained in Sections 1-3. Section 1 entitled "Definitions" defines not only
the property to be protected, but also the conduct proscribed. Trade secrets are defined as having
independent economic value and as being subject to efforts to keep them secret. The prohibited
conduct is defined in paragraph (2) of Section 1. Sections 2 and 3 provide for injunctive relief and
damages. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2002).
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A similar structure could work for the transfer of personal information. The
policy underpinning of personal data protection is the societal interest in protecting
individual privacy. This would be implemented by recognizing a quasi property
interest in the individual's personal data, expressed as an individual's right to control
the use of personal data under certain circumstances. 123
Similar to trade secrets, a mandatory norm 124 would further provide that
personal data cannot be disclosed or used, except in the manner provided by the
owner. This type of structure would allow the data subjects to contract freely for the
transfer of personal data, with the assurance that they would be treated in
125
accordance with their preferences.
The comparison works well for transactions between A and B and possibly B and
C, but thereafter breaks down. Because in trade secrets successive transfers are the
exception rather than the norm, 126 trade secret law does not offer a true solution for
the downstream transfer of obligations.
Otherwise stated, in the transaction
between A and B, B is legally obligated to observe A's preferences. When B transfers
the data to C, A may have a contract-based remedy against B, but A will have no
basis for preventing C, D and subsequent transferees from misusing the data,
because no privity of contract exists. To adequately compensate A, B would have to
be held responsible for all subsequent possible misuses of the data. It is in the
nature of their use that personal data are transferred countless times to successive
transferees. If B were to be held responsible for possible misuse by each of these
countless transferees, B's liability would be proportionate not to his own misconduct,
but to an unpredictable number of successive transferees.
Several solutions could be adopted as a "fix" to this inequitable result. One
possibility would be to designate A as a third-party beneficiary to the agreement
between B and C, and also in subsequent transactions. This would permit A to
enforce the promise to observe preferences against downstream transferees. If one of
them failed to designate A as a beneficiary, A could have a remedy against that
particular transferee.
Alternatively, the indemnity model has been suggested for downstream transfer
of obligations and shifting the risk of non-compliant conduct. 127 This model avoids
judicial intervention by expressing an obligation in contractual terms, whereby one
party agrees that in specified circumstances, including its own wrongdoing, it will
compensate the other party. This process is flexible, because it allows the parties to
negotiate indemnity for certain perceived risks that may not necessarily be
cognizable as wrongdoings under the law. 128 In practice it would work as follows: in
the event onward transferees fail to respect the terms under which the data were
123 These principles are already present in U.S. law. Soo supra note 95 and text accompanying
notes 101-03.
124 See Schwartz, Health Care Information, supranote 76, at 51-75 (explaining that mandatory
rules are preset expressions of policy choices made by the legislature, which cannot be waived or

negotiated around).
125

Id.at 60-61.

126

Seo supratext accompanying notes 90-91.

Ritter, supra note 97, at 131-32 (requiring A to indemnify B for any damages resulting from
A's delivering of bad data to B). Indemnification assures the transferor that damages resulting from
non-compliant conduct shift to the transferee along with the data. d. at 132.
127

128

Id. at 127.
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originally transferred from A to B, B will be liable to A. To protect itself against this
liability, B will ask C to assume responsibility for its own conduct and for that of
onward transferees, and C will ask D and so on. Purely contractual indemnity is a
viable model only if the transferee has the financial resources to satisfy the
indemnity agreement. Because A has no control in selecting the transferee and
consequently cannot assess his financial strength, this is an unfair risk to impose
129
upon A.
Finally, the obligation could be passed on downstream via a duty implied by law.
This concept is slightly different, in that it is imposed by law rather than negotiated
by the parties. 130 The mechanism however, is not foreign to U.S. courts.1 31 For
instance, California law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into every
contract.1 32 In the same manner, an obligation to honor preferences could be implied
into every data transfer contract, regardless of whether the data are transferred by
the data subject or a subsequent recipient. This would relieve A and each successive
transferee of the burden of bargaining for the promise and of the risk of diminishing
their quidpro quo.
All of these doctrines present a certain theoretical appeal. However, in practice
they give rise to problems for both the data subject and the collector or user.
From the data subject's point of view, a contract-based solution is unsatisfactory
because not all data are captured in settings which allow the data subject to state its
preferences. For instance, data that are derived from sources such as public or
government databases would not be subject to contractual obligations imposed in an
inter partes transaction. Coverage of these data can only be ensured by a norm
imposed erga omnes via common or statutory law.
From the collector or user's point of view, compliance with the requirements of
the Fair Information Principles can be very onerous. 13 3 Providing notice by mail
every time an individual's data are used or transferred would involve a prohibitive
cost to the user and deluge the data subject in a flood of unwanted paperwork.
Similarly, each user would have to put in place a technological infrastructure which
allows for the segregation of data, depending on the opt in or opt out choices made by
the data subject, and ensures that the data subject has the ability to access and
correct the data maintained by the user. This infrastructure would have to be
interoperable, at least to some extent with other similar infrastructures, in order to
allow for the transfer of data along with the associated preferences. The solutions
discussed do not address these problems.
129 Idat

131.

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) (discussing contractual obligations
implied at law). The Restatement (Second) states:
unlike true contracts, quasi-contracts are not based on the apparent intention of
the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor are they promises.
They are obligations created by law for reasons of justice. Such obligations were
ordinarily enforced at common law in the same form of action (assumpsit) that
was appropriate to true contracts.
Id.
130 RESTATEMENT

131 Id.
132

(1982).

133

Seamen's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil, 129 Cal. App. 3d 416, 181 Cal. Rptr. 126
Schwartz, Health Care Information, supra note 76; see also Schwartz, Privaey and

Democracy in Cyberspace, supra note 76.
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Finally, the above legal solutions leave the transfer of the data and preferences
to the parties. Apart from being cumbersome to the collector or user, this method
does not afford particularly good protection to the data subject. The data are
normally subject to hundreds or even thousands of downstream transactions, many
of which involve human intervention and consequently a increased risk of error. In
the course of these multiple successive transfers, the data may easily become lost,
corrupted or disassociated from their preferences and no resource exists to verify
their accuracy.

IV. A Two-PRONGED SOLUTION: LAW AND TECHNOLOGY COMBINED
To find an answer to these questions, it helps to take a step back and consider
the origin of the data protection problem. Clearly, the present predicament arises
out of an unprecedented proliferation of large quantities of data resulting from rapid
technological development. Modern information technology has created capabilities
for collecting, storing, retrieving and transferring data that have never existed in the
past. Because these capabilities lie at the root of the current proliferation of data,
these same capabilities must be looked to in seeking a solution to the data privacy
problem.
This paper proposes an integrated law-technology solution, whose
advantages are obvious.
First, a technology-based solution would reduce the cost of compliance to data
users. The cost of manually or semi-manually performing the functions of notice,
choice, access, data integrity and onward transfer under a comprehensive data
privacy regulation would be prohibitive. An electronic infrastructure designed for
this purpose could reduce the cost of these transactions to a minimum.
Second, a technology-based solution enhances the utility and value of personal
data to all parties involved. The focus of current legislation reflects a tension
between offering protection to the consumer and making the maximum use of the
data. This "either-or" approach is evident in methods such as the opt-in/opt-out
choice. Opt-in/opt-out is a fairly rudimentary mechanism. It does not allow for a
fine-tuning of preferences in a way that would satisfy the consumer's need for
selected information and the industry's need for making products and services
known. Consider, for instance, a consumer's preference "do not disclose date of birth,
unless it is to obtain a discount on a cruise to Norwegian fjords." Given only two
choices the consumer would opt out of disclosure. Given a fine-tuned option, a
consumer would more likely opt in. Both parties would benefit: the consumer saves
time by not having to research cruise providers, and the cruise providers have access
to an interested consumer without the need for a market study. In short, a finetuned solution allows for a very efficient matching process.
Third, a technology-based solution would give the data subjects greater control
over its data and their use. The system's architecture would be implemented so as to
provide the data subject realistic access and the opportunity to verify and correct.
Although the "access/opportunity to correct" principle is an elementary requirement
of the FIPs, in practice it is most often ignored. 134 This is largely due to the cost of
134 Schwartz, Health Care Information, supra note 76; see also Schwartz, Privacy and
Democracy in Cyberspace, supra note 76.
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implementing a special architecture that permits such access in case of every
13 5
collector or user.
Below is an outline of several functions that could be assigned to a technological
infrastructure as part of a comprehensive personal data privacy law.

A. The Technological Component- Collection, Transfer and Storage OfData and
Preference Information
Standardized methods for the electronic handling of personal data are not
new. 136 One method developed for this purpose is the P3P protocol, for use in online
transactions. 13 7 This protocol enables individuals to program their browsers to
identify classes of information that they are willing or unwilling to disclose.138 The
negotiation would therefore take place at the browser level, and the individuals
139
would not have to haggle over the terms and conditions with every site they visit.
Browsers can be programmed to avoid sites that do not comport with the individual's
privacy preferences.1 40 Although P3P has been subject to some criticism, 141 certain
142
commentators believe that P3P will be an effective solution to the privacy problem.
This may be true as far as online transactions between browsers are concerned.
However, not all privacy violations occur online or are the result of online data
collections. Of equal concern are the large quantities of data that derive from sources
such as the DMV, the local grocery store or professional service providers, or data
initially supplied voluntarily in the course of, and possibly in consideration of, an
offline transaction. These data are collected in the normal course of business by
many entities and then sold to aggregators, who combine them with the data
collected online and sell them on to third parties.14 3 Consequently, due to the high
degree of integration of online and offline data, a comprehensive solution to the data
problem must cover both online and offline transactions.
Because personal data are typically subject to numerous successive transfers,
only a technological solution can ensure that the data remain permanently associated
with a given set of preferences throughout the transfer. A possible approach would
be to create an encrypted digital "envelope" which contains the data along with their
attributes, i.e. the individual's preferences. Transfer of the digital envelope or of
information contained therein, would be facilitated by a specially-designed protocol.
To ensure that information contained in the envelope has not been tampered with, a
digital signature could authenticate the envelope. The signature would be issued by
1:35
Id.
136 See Karen Coyle, Pretty Poor Prjvacy? A Social Analysis of the Platform for Privacy
Preforences(June 1999), at http ://www.kcoyle.net/p3p.html.
1:37
Id.

Id.
Id.
1Ho
Id.
141 Id.
138
139

supra note 100, at 160.
143 For instance, Direct Media, a mailing list broker in Greenwich, Conn., offers access to 2.9
million Lycos users at a cost of $125 per thousand names for a single mailing. An extra $15 per
thousand lets marketers select users showing an interest in a certain topic. Saul Hansell, "P'ivacy
Policy on Web Shifts as ProfitsEbb," THE N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 2002, at Al.
142 LESSIG,
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an information registrar or a certifying agency that could also serve as a source of re144
verification of the authenticity of the attributes every time a new sale occurs.
This protocol would likely be a component of a more comprehensive
infrastructure. For instance, the data envelopes could be stored in personal data
repositories that could be either centralized or distributed. These repositories could
be general or organized by subject matter, e.g. financial information, health
information, etc. A new user would obtain authorization to use the data from the
data subject, but the data themselves would be released by the data repository. The
repository would serve a function similar to that of a bank. Its operator would be
responsible to A for the accuracy of data and to B and C for correctly carrying out the
transaction itself. The repository containing the original and accurate data and
attributes would certify each release of data to a new user. In addition to acting as a
repository, the repository operator could also take the place of B and act as collector
of information for sale to third parties.
Finally, the repository would electronically discharge the functions incident to
the Fair Information Principles.
A review of these principles 145 - notice, choice,
access,

onward transfer,

data integrity

and

security 146

-

reveals

that their

requirements are not only capable of, but are indeed suited to, execution by an
automated system. Notice, choice and access are functions that require interaction
with the data subject. They can easily be performed by a protocol which, upon
receipt of certain instructions, sends out notices, receives and registers preferences
and allows data subjects access upon proof of identity. The onward transfer principle
is met by the mandatory norm imposed upon all collectors/users of data. 147 The
principles of data integrity and security are quintessentially technological functions
and require no interaction with the data subject. Their performance flows naturally
from the infrastructure's security features.
Further details for the architecture supporting the technological infrastructure
are beyond the scope of this paper and this author's sphere of competence, are best
developed in conjunction with specialists in software programming and systems
architecture.

B. The Legal Component:Norms of Conduct

1. Norms Governing the User's Conduct
Once the transfer of data and preferences is delegated to a technological
infrastructure, the norms governing the conduct of data users easily falls into place.

M See Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-BasedID, Rights Management and TrustedSystems, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1257 (2000) (describing one way of creating a secure infrastructure by means of
a "trusted system").
1451
As articulated in the Safe Harbor formulation which is the most expansive of FIP versions.
146 The FIP of "enforcement" is met via the mandatory norms which provide for availability of
expedited and economically viable redress.
147 See infra text accompanying notes 149-52.
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The analogy that suggests itself is the doctrine of "encumbrances" to property in
the law of real estate. This real estate doctrine was created to ensure that
downstream transferees of real property are bound by certain pre-existing obligations
incident to the property. 148
This is accomplished by obligations permanently
associated with a piece of property intended "to bind the assigns of the covenantor
and to vest in the assigns of the covenantee, in the same manner as if they had
personally entered into them." 149 The obligations pass on extra-contractually in the
form of a "covenant that runs with the land."150 Originally a common-law norm, the
covenant was subsequently codified 151 and provides that a transferee of real estate
may, under given circumstances, acquire the property subject to the burden of the
obligations incident to that particular property.152
This model is applicable to personal data as well. A "covenant that runs with the
data" would serve as an extra-contractual method for binding downstream
153
transferees. In practice, this solution would work as follows: a mandatory norm
would bind the data user to the data subject's preferences and compliance with the
FIPs. 154 The user would be granted a license to use the data contained in the data
subject's information "envelope" only in accordance with the limitations set forth
therein. Access to the information itself would be gained through a data repository.
A legislated provision of this nature would substitute for a contract between the data
subject or transferor and transferee and would relieve the data subject and
downstream transferees from having to pass on the obligations downstream.
The pendant to the covenant running with the land is a public notice function,
which serves to inform the public of the existence and the nature of the encumbrance.
Real estate law has established an elaborate structure of public notice via
registration in a centrally-designated location, normally the County Recorder's
office. 155 Its cost is supported by charging a small fraction of the value of real estate
for each transaction. In the same way, a personal data repository would serve to
provide notice of preferences, access to data subjects and to users, while being
financed by a small fraction of the value of each transaction.
A legislated norm must further provide for an expedited and economically viable
mechanism for redress of possible violations. This requires correcting the imbalance
between the cost of enforcement and the potential recovery, which, if measured by

148

See Martin v. Ray, 76 Cal. App. 2d 471 (1946).
§ 1460 (2002).

149 CAL. CIV. CODE

150 "Certain covenants, contained in grants of estates in real property, are appurtenant to such
estates, and pass with them, so as to bind the assigns of the covenantor and to vest in the assigns of

the covenantee, in the same manner as if they had personally entered into them. Such covenants
are said to run with the land." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1460 (2002).
151 Id.
152 Martin, 76 Cal. App. 2d 471.
"The burden imposed by the transaction is on the land
conveyed and incident to its ownership. When grantees acquired the property it was taken subject to
the burden; and the benefit of the covenants passed as incident of their ownership." Id.
153 Mandatory rules are preset expressions of policy choices made by the legislature that
cannot be waived or negotiated around. For a discussion of mandatory and default rules, see
Schwartz, Health Care Information, supra note 76.

154 Id.

155 Id.
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the value of the data, can be very low. Statutory damages 156 can serve both to
compensate the victim and to deter against violations of the mandatory norms. From
the procedural point of view, an expedited remedy for personal data transfer
violations, including injunctive relief, is necessary to fully protect the data subject.
Finally, a mandatory norm should prohibit immoral commercial activities, such
as misappropriation of personal data, unauthorized collection/use, stripping data of
their identifiers or attributes, use of unauthenticated personal data, fraud,
misrepresentation, or hacking into the encrypted envelope in which the data are
stored.157

2. Norms Governing the Technological Component
Use of technology creates a new class of participants in the transaction, namely
the data repository operator. Its role is to safeguard the data subjects' personal data
and preferences and to vouch for the accuracy of the information. The obligations
incident to these functions require imposition of fiduciary duties upon the repository
operator.
Finally, a key issue is whether legislation should specify the parameters of the
technological infrastructure. Since technological advances far outpace the ability of
legislatures to pass laws, specification of a particular technology or even systems
architecture is not indicated. Instead, the systems architecture and its functions are
governed by the desired policy goals. The policy goals at issue for the present
purposes are the Fair Information Principles. 158 Because discharge of the obligations
incident to the FIPs is well suited for automated handling, 159 this function is in its
entirety delegated to the technological infrastructure. To ensure that the desired
policy goals are achieved, it is critical to incorporate the FIPs into the mandatory
norms governing the technological component of a two-prong privacy legislation. 160

CONCLUSION
An inherent tension exists between the individual's privacy interest and the
data users' desire to maximize the commercial use of personal data. This tension
continues to be an obstacle to enactment of comprehensive privacy legislation
relating to personal data. Proposed legislation errs either on the side of favoring the

156These damages could be in the nature of the ones imposed by the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §
504(c) (2002); Anticyberpiracy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2002).
157 J. Elford, Trafficking In Stolen Information: A Heriarehy Of Rights Approach To The
Private Facts Tort, 105 YALE L.J. 727, 727 (1995).
158See discussion supra Part II.A.
159 See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
160 An additional reason why this is important, is that the methodology selected for this
technologically based solution, as well as its configurations and system design choices, are likely to
have themselves a regulatory effect. See Schwartz, supra note 101, at 782. It is therefore very
important to supplement this type of solution by a regulatory back-up that would ensure correct
implementation of the desired public policy.
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consumer, by imposing onerous burdens on the collector or user, or on the side of the
collector or user, by providing inadequate privacy protection.
Both extremes stem from the fact that the quantity of data is, in practice, not
manageable by traditional methods.
Because the current unprecedented
proliferation of data is due to technological developments, it makes sense to seek a
solution that utilizes the capabilities of technology at the maximum level.
The present paper attempts to outline a legislative solution that relies heavily
on the use of a technological infrastructure. The advantages it presents are that: (1)
it affords enhanced privacy protection, by ensuring that all parties involved in data
transactions honor the individual's privacy preferences; (2) data collectors or users
are relieved of many of the onerous compliance requirements imposed by the Fair
Information Practices, and (3) the value of personal data is maximized, for the
benefit of both data subjects and users.
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